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The World Bank publication "Assessing  Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why"
generated a new wave of controversy  about foreign aid and policy conditionality that had
seen several decades of intense debate. Much of the recent  debate has focused on the aid-
growth relationship and the role of "good" policies.  While a great deal has been said
about qualitative aspects of aid-effectiveness  (i.e. fungibility,  among other things),  little
attention has been paid so far to some important quantitative aspects. The present study
draws attention to this neglected  aspect of the aid debate to demonstrate  that the level of
aid requirements  of a country is an equally important and  integral part of aid and aid-
effectiveness.  The World Bank/IMF approaches  to estimation of external assistance
requirements  of a country in quantitative terms is compared with an alternative  model,
the so-called "Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model" (based on the Harrod
trade multiplier). It is revealed that the latter is not a real alternative as  it is an incomplete
model. More importantly,  it is shown that international  financial institutions use these
quantitative  frameworks  in a very flexible and pragmatic way to carry on a meaningful
policy dialogue with both donors and recipient countries,  which has an important bearing
on aid-effectiveness.3
Introduction.
The publication  by the World Bank entitled "Assessing Aid: What Works, What
Doesn't, and Why,"  (see,  The World Bank,  1998,) has generated  a great deal of debate
among,  academics,  professional  economists,  and policy makers.2  The World Bank report
asserted that aid does help to increase growth in countries with sound economic
management.  The main message of the report both to aid recipients as well  as donors was
that aid should be allocated to recipient countries  in accordance  with their policy
environments.  These ideas  about aid effectiveness,  future of development aid, and policy
conditionality associated with the new approach  to aid have come under considerable
criticism (see for example,  Dalgaard  and Hansen (2001), Doombos (2001),Guillaumont
and Chauvet (2001), Hermes and Lensink (2001), Hoeven (2001), Hansen and Tarp
(2000), Lensink and White (2000).
One aspect of this debate that has not received a great deal of discussion until
recently  relates to the question of analytical models for determining the extent of aid
requirements  of a country. In his study on "The Ghost of the Financing Gap:  How the
Harrod-Domar Model still Haunts Development Economics"  Easterly (1999,  see also
1997) pointed out that the Harrod-Domar  model is still being used by leading
international  financial institutions (IMF,  WB,  etc) and regional agencies  to measure
foreign resource requirements,  to allocate aid, and to provide advice to developing
countries on economic  policy. He observed  that the Harrod-Domar  model was not
intended as a growth model, and was in fact repudiated by one of its authors four decades
2Scc also, the background  studies to that report by Burnsidc  and Dollar (1997  and 2000)  and Collier and Dollar (1999)4
ago. Easterly encouraged  the academic/professional  development comununity  to closely
evaluate  the analytical  models used by international  financial institutions for determining
foreign aid.
Picking up Easterly's challenge,  in an article in the Journal of Post-Keynesian
Economics (Fall 2001) titled "Exorcising  the ghost: An alternative model for measuring
the financing gap  in developing countries", Nureldin Hussain (2001) presented an
"alternative"  approach to address "interrelated  questions of how to predict growth, how
to measure the financing gap, and how to allocate aid and measure its development
effectiveness."  Hussain stated that so far there has not been a credible alternative  to the
Harrod-Domar model and that this creates a dilemma for policy makers. In this view, the
"dominant think tank of World Bank is now shifting from the aid-financed  investment
toward a new paradigm - good policies plus money,"  but "this new paradigm has no
unifonn philosophy to address the interrelated  questions" of aid and development. To
address such questions, Hussain  advocates the use of the so-called  "Balance of Payments
Constrained Growth Model" of Thirlwall  and Hussain (1982) - referred to as the T-H
model. According  to Hussain,  this latter model "introduces a convenient methodology
backed by a growth model  to estimate resource requirements,  as well as providing "new"
insights with regard to the fomnulation  of development policies and  assessing the
effectiveness  of development assistance."
Hussain presented  a very interesting form of the T-H model with actual
applications  for a number of African countries.  While simplicity and clarity are virtues5
that any user would appreciate,  the T-H model, unfortunately,  does not present a
"credible alternative."  In part, the problem seems to emanate from the particular
presentation of the T-H model:  it is not a complete model.  Thus, the T-H model ends up
with an incomplete estimate of the financing gap. It appears that Hussain has somewhat
misunderstood  the so-called  World Bank model and Easterly's observations  on the "ghost
of financing gap". To clarify these issues,  we first begin with a very brief description  of a
stylized version of the "standard"  model used by the World Bank for country  operations
work, which Easterly took to task.  Second, a comparison  of this "standard" version with
the T-H model reveals that the latter is almost an exact copy of one of the key
relationships  of the former.  The T-H model leaves out other key relationship such as the
investment-savings  gap, the fiscal gap and the monetary implications  of the balance  of
payments.  Thus, the T-H model fails to address the fundamental question raised  by
Easterly, and cannot be considered  an "alternative".  Furthermore,  it is also clear that both
Easterly and Hussain have failed to appreciate  how the World Bank and IMF models are
used in practice: that is, how Bank/lMIF economists,  policy makers, and donors have used
these models in a very flexible way to overcome  some of their well-known  shortcomings.
Thus, it appears  that both Easterly  and Hussain are ghost-busters chasing after elusive, if
not almost non-existent  "ghosts."6
The "standard"  framework of the "Three-Gap" model  of the World Bank3
In the following paragraphs, a description of the World Bank's model is given
with the variables expressed in level tenrs. While this model can be given in more
compact fonn to show its properties,  we opt to give a description of the actual working
model used by the country  economists  in the World Bank. The "standard" model used by
many World Bank country management units (known  as the Revised Minimum
Standards Model  Extended - RMSM-X) belongs to a class of "three-gap"  models widely
used by developing countries  (see Bacha (1990), Iqbal(1997), Khan(,  Sepehri, Moshiri
and Doudongee (2000),Taylor(1990))  that is an extended version of the "two-gap" model
introduced by Chenery and Strout (1966).  It consists of two modules: the flow of funds
module that sets the accounting  identities and a few behavioral  equations  (FOF), and a
external  debt module  that brings in information of external debt related transactions
(DM). The basic version contains four economic agents or "sectors":  Central
Govenunent,  the Monetary  System (Central Bank and Deposit Money Banks), the
"Private"  Sector4 ("Rest of the Economy" including households and private firms,  non-
central govermment agencies, parastatal  enterprises,  and non-monetary financial
institutions) and the Foreign  Sector.
Equations of the "standard" model5
The savings-investment  gap:
Thc "standard" three-gap  model has conic tindcr a grcat dcal of criticism from World Bank economists, and therc had been a number
of attempts  to find altematives  that arc capablc of handling old issucs and ncw dcmands, including povcrty-related  work (see,
Dcvarajan ct al  (1994), Agesior, et  al (2000).
4The so-called 'Private  Sector'  should bc interpreted  as a residtial  sector, i.e. whatever  sector the uscr does not specify scparately  will
be in this 'Private Sector.'
s For the  symbols used. see  appendix  1.7
Y  - (Cg +  Cp)  - ( Ig + Ip)  =  X  - IM  (1)
The foreign exchange gap:
X - IM +  NFY +  NCT  + KTfg + DFI + POR + NLT + NST + dRES = GAPF  (2)
The fiscal  gap:
NTXpg + Td + (Ti - Sub) +  NCTfg  +  NFfg  +  NFgp + Krev - Ig - NKTRgp  =
=  Lmg + Lpg + KTfg + NLTfg  + NSTfg  (3)
The monetary sector flows are summarized  by equation (4) below:
L,l,p +  Lnlig +  dRES  =  dM + dNOL  (4)
Ignoring many sectoral details, this  stylized version of the model can be
summarized to consist of 4 equations  and 33 variables.6 A particular version of this
consistency framework in summary form is given in the appendix 2. To obtain a
numerical  solutioni (33-4) variables  should be assigned values. In this process,  a number
of important variables  are "endogenized"  by specifying several  appropriate behavioral
equations.  Some of these are discussed below in the section on typical behavioral
structure of the model.  For the remainder,  several different  methods of exogenously
specifying the expected values for the variables  are adopted.  These,  in fact, could also be
considered as sub-models  depending on the degree of details accommodated.
Typical behavioral equations of the model
The money demand function:
M  =  P  y  /  v  (5)
6The  5s equation of thc system,  i.e. that for thc private scetor is redundant  according to Wairas'  law.The investment/output  relation:
l(t)  =  ICOR(t+l)  *  [ y(t+1)  - y(t)]  (6)
Private consumption  function:
Cp  = c  * (Y  - T  +  NCTR  +  NFY)  (7)
Import  functions:
IMi  =  f(yC,  RERi)  (8)
Manufacturing  exports function:
Xm =  f(yf, RERm)  (9)
Other exports:
Xi  =  (I +gxi)  * Xi(t- 1)  (10)
The model can be solved using one of several approaches.  First, all resource
flows could be specified exogenously  and the model could then be solved for the implied
growth and inflation  rates.7 Second,  resource requirements  (including the additional
foreign exchange needs)  could be estimated for given growth and inflation assumptions.
Most users of the model adopt the latter approach  for computational  convenience.  Either
approach  could be considered  as a first step in an iterative process that converges  to a
feasible solution  to the model.8
To evaluate the extemal  sustainability of the country,  a module that incorporates
external  debt infonnation supplements  the flow-of-funds  framework.  This enables the
calculation  of the debt servicing capacity of the country taking into account the existing
In  World Bank terminology this is called the "availabilities"  approach  to model solution.
Since no explicit objectivc function is used, the solition  is best described as a feasible one.  The importance of iteration  in
this process cannot be overemphasized.9
stock of external  debt and changes in that stock as  a result of the projected  balance of
payments outcomes as given by the flow-of-funds  part of the model. In other words, the
interaction  of the infonnation on external debt flows and the flow-of-funds  facilitates  the
mapping of the implications of alternative profiles of aid-financing to the balance  of
payments.
Investment-Savings  Behavior  and the Calculation of "financing gap".
For the last two decades, the Harrod-Domar specification embodied  in equation (6)
above had been under challenge by numerous academics, World Bank/IMF economists
and other users of this type of "standard"  model9.  However,  Easterly added a new
dimension to that challenge by alluding to the "ghost of financing  gap" by emphasizing
the implications  to an important outcome of the model, namely foreign aid allocation.
And this important variable has also an equally significant bearing on the lending
programs and policies of the World Bank/IMF, other multi-lateral  and bilateral donors.
After a critical evaluation of the "financing  gap" model  in light of growth theory,
Easterly (1999) concluded that "...in the short run, there is no theoretical  reason in
standard neoclassical  and endogenous growth models to expect the ICOR to be a measure
of investment quality, to be the derivative of growth with respect to investment,  or to be
constant during transitions."  Considering  a number of specific country experiences,
Easterly (1999) then went on to assert that the "financing  gap" model has little empirical
validity. From a fairly rigorous viewpoint, these indeed were very valid criticisms of the
type of models in question.  Unfortunately,  however, Easterly did not propose any
9 Some have in fact opted to drop  the  relationship between investment and growth and have
instead adopted an output adjustment mechanism  in the  Keynesian tradition  (see,  Bacha,
1990 and  Taylor,  1994)10
alternative  models that the international  financial  institutions could possibly use in the
given  context.
Comparison of "three-gap" and T-H models.
The "standard" model can easily be presented in such a way as to conform to the T-
H model by appropriately  aggregating variables  so as to retain only those that are used by
T-H. and expressing the results in  growth rate fomi.  However,  by retaining the details
that actually are considered within the framework  of the "standard" model, we also want
to emphasize  the fact that a great deal of information and empirical work goes into the
use of the framework than appears at first sight. For example,  a function may be
developed for direct foreign investnent into the particular country under study or the
value assumed may be based on already approved projects (such as  oil pipelines, hydro-
electric  dams, etc) from available reports  etc..
The important point to note is that by considering  a subset of variables in equation
(2), one can easily arrive at the result showni  by the T-H model's equation (5)  in growth
rate form (see, Hussain (2001)).  It is clear that the sub-set of the variables  considered  by
Hussain in his equations (2),  (3), and (4) - and therefore,  in the resulting equation (5) - is
the sum of the current and capital account transactions of the balance of payments.
Hence, of course, the origin of the term "balance of payments  constrained growth."
Ignoring the richer details in the World Bank presentation,  it appears that the T-H model
is based on the same aggregative  import/export elasticities that underpin the World
Bank's balance of payments equations.  However, while focusing on the balance of11
payments gap is  unavoidable,  it is not the same thing as asserting that the external gap  is
the only constraint and that it is the "dominant constraint on output growth".  In some
developing countries, this may not be the case.  It is precisely because of this reason that
Chenery  and Strout (1966) laid emphasis  on the "two gap" approach  and the inter-related
nature of the savings-investment  and foreign exchange gaps.
In contrast to the World Bank's model that incorporates  three inter-related gaps, the
T-H model  is focused exclusively on one gap:  the balance of payments constraint. The
T-H model has no explicit savings-investment  gap, which is given in equation (1)  above.
Neither does the T-H model contain  a fiscal gap. In the T-H model, therefore,  one has to
assume that the savings-investment  gap and the fiscal gap are actually implicit. To claim
that the T-H model is indeed an "alternative"  in the context under consideration,  it is
necessary to explicitly show how the balance of payments constrained  growth is related
to the investment-savings  gap and the fiscal gap.  As can be seen from the World Bank's
model, this can be done only  in a consistent accounting framework that is based on
behavioral  relations explaining aggregate growth,  savings and investment that are
consistent with the balance of payments (or vice-versa)  and the fiscal variables. The
essence of Easterly's criticism was that the Harrod-Domar based simple
investment/growth  behavioral relation assumed  in the World Bank model was neither
theoretically  satisfying nor empirically valid, especially  in the short-run.  Easterly was
well disposed to make that statement as he had substantially contributed  to the evolution
of the current form  of the World Bank's model.  Sweeping this problem under the carpet12
in the T-H model is not a satisfactory  solution as the savings-investment gap and the
fiscal gap cannot disappear into thin air.
The T-H estimate of foreign exchange  requirements  to achieve a given target rate of
growth (see,  his equations  8 and 9) is only a partial representation of the total foreign
exchange needs of a country. Considering the more comprehensive  balance of payments
account given  in equation  (2)  above, it is clear that the T-H model does not explicitly
show the foreign exchange  requirements  relating to the maintenance  of a desired (or
target)  level of foreign reserves (dRES), which is a very important variable  in a policy
dialogue.  It is possible to argue that the change in reserves is somehow  embedded in the
two parameters  of the T-H  model relating to the proportions  of the total import bill
financed by export earnings and capital  flows. If this is the case, it is a somewhat
confusing  way to take account of this factor and is bound to cause problems in practical
implementation  of the T-H-n  model. The desired  or target level of net foreign assets  is a
key element of the IMF financial programming  framework, which is underpinned by the
monetary model of the balance of payments. Maintaining an adequate level of foreign
assets  to meet import payments  is a crucial foreign exchange requirement  facing many
developing countries. Thus, the foreign financing gap estimate of the T-H model is only a
partial estimate of requirements  as it fails to account for the total foreign exchange
requirements of a country, including the need to build up external reserves.
Considering the T-H model in the context of explaining growth rate differences  by
demand constrains associated with the balance of payments,  Elliot and Rhodd (1999)13
came to the conclusion that the T-H model "to be less than complete because  it omitted
the effect of debt servicing."  Elliot and Rhodd demonstrated that the simple Harrod
multiplier will over-predict  growth if the rate of change in debt servicing is greater than
the rate of capital inflows, and the model will under-predict if the rate of capital inflows
is greater than the rate of change in debt servicing.
Furthermore,  an important shortcoming of the T-H model is that it fails to trace the
monetary implications  of the balance of payments outcomes, which is at the heart of the
IMF's financial  programming framework. The Fund's framework integrates monetary,
income and balance  of payments analysis,  and is also the basis for credit allocation to
member countries  (see,  Polak  (1997),  Khan and Montiel (1989), Khan, Montiel,  and
Haque (1990), Bolnick (1999),  JMF(1977),  IMF(1987)).  Unlike the T-H model, the
World Bank's "standard"  model is roughly comparable  to the IMF's financial
programming  framework as both these models  are built on the same accounting
framework.  More importantly,  both the Fund and Bank models  explicitly address the
important policy problem of maintaining a target level of foreign exchange  reserves and
the implications  of that target to the monetary/credit  variables in the given country. The
monetary model of the balance of payments is the theoretical underpinning  of the
domestic credit ceilings (especially  the credit to govermment  sector) that are part of IMF
conditionality.  Unfortunately,  the T-H model does not address  these questions explicitly.14
Practical applications of models  in macroeconomic  policy work
Why the macroeconomic  framework  needs to be explicitly treated in an integrated
manner can also be considered  from a very practical  point of view. In their work, donors,
policy makers  at country level,  and country economists  at international organizations
have to be concerned  with an integrated  view of macroeconomic  developments.  That is,
they consider the three gaps (the savings-investment,  the foreign exchange  and the fiscal
balance)  in a consistent manner.  All the parties in a policy dialogue demand to see the
basic infonnation regarding  growth, inflation, the balance of payments, the fiscal  gap, the
external debt indicators (the standard external exposure indicators  as well as details about
concessionary  financing  availabilities  etc). Even if the T-H model is used,  it would be
necessary to present the implications of a macroeconomic  scenario in terms of all three
gaps. More specifically,  it would be necessary to translate the growth and financing gap
arrived at by T-H to their private and public components of investment and savings.  This
is particularly  important for tracing the implications  of a balance of payments  outcome on
the public investment and budgetary financing situation of the country under
consideration.  This is a point missed by both Hussain  and Easterly.  In Hussain's  case, it
results in a mistaken claim that he has found an "alternative"  model. Ignoring this real
life process makes the T-H model more of an academic exercise.
In Easterly's case, it appears that he was carried away by the lack of rigor in the
Harrod-Domar specification  that underlies the World Bank's model and he missed the
importance of the procedure that leads to the identification of the so-called "financing15
gap."  The World Bank's model is not a rigorous  tool, but rather a "back of envelope"
calculation  (as Easterly mentioned)  that enables  a dialogue among different partners:  the
country-specific  policy makers, the country economists  in the World Bank and/or IMF,
and  the donor countries'  representatives.  The World Bank'and/or the IMF's models and
projections provide a consistent framework within  which a meaningful dialogue  on the
growth, inflation, balance  of payments,  and fiscal implications of several external  sector
developments  and policy scenarios  can be carried out.  One such important instance is the
Special Program for Africa (SPA) where the "financing gap" is a crucial  indicator for the
dialogue between  the donors and the country officials. Another is the Country Assistance
Strategy (CAS) of the World Bank. As mentioned before,  a large volume of information
is utilized to draw up "high",  "'most  reasonable"  and "low" case  scenarios, which are
presented for consideration.  In identifying the relevant "financing gaps", country
economists  are not solely guided by the Harrod-Domar model as Easterly would want us
to believe (Easterly (1999).  As mentioned  before, they take into account a large number
of factors such as possibly  lum-lpy investments,  productivity,  and emerging opportunities
for export-diversification  etc..  The resulting growth model, however, may be cast in the
Harrod-Doinar  framework,  more as  a convenient way to summarize the scenarios  and
results than to be "dogmatic".  In his quest of rigor,  Easterly seems to have overlooked
this procedural  aspect, which actually, in a sense, does not rely that much on the formal
Harrod-Domar  specification of growth.' 0 In this sense, it is hard to see where the "ghost"
is  in the "financing  gap."
'°  For a very pragmatic description of the  usc of the  financial programming  iimodel of the  IMF for stabilization  policy, sec Mussa and
Savastano (1999).16
As pointed out above,  ignoring the savings-investment  relation within the
framework under consideration has resulted  in the T-H model taking an incomplete view
of the interrelations  under consideration.  Thus, the T-H model has not only failed to
address the investment-savings  gap  issue treated by Easterly but also has grossly
underestimated the importance of the iterative procedure that is used in the World Bank
and related organizations  to arrive at "financing  gaps."  This iterative procedure
essentially concerns the identification of balance of payments  financing requirements  and
fiscal  deficits that are mutually consistent  in the "three gap" framework  shown above.
Referring to the savings-investment  gap, Hussain states that "...measuring the
resource gap as the difference  between planned investment and planned savings does not
mean that capital inflows to fill the gap will automatically be invested or that they are
predestined for investment.  The T-ll approach  does not imply such presumptions."
Neither do the World Bank/lMF  models or their country  economic work carry such
presumptions.  Besides, the  World Banlk and the 1MF, after 50 years of experience,  do not
seem to carry any illusions about the implementation capacities  in member countries. The
question here  is not so much about presumptions  as about practical implications of capital
inflows to finance public and private investment.  In the World Bank/IMF frameworks,
the relative magnitudes of resource flows have an important bearing on both the time path
and the nature of the policy package  that is designed for implementation.  When
shortfalls in implementation occur,  the targets for resource flows as well as
implementation  schedules  are revised.  Given this iterative  process of aid-related work at17
the international  financial institutions,  it is hard to believe Easterly's assertion that these
institutions assume that "aid will go into investment one for one" (Easterly,  1999).
One important consideration  worth mentioning in the policy dialogue  in programs
such as the SPA is the explicit treatment  of the external indebtedness  of a country. The
external  debt module (DM) attached  to the "standard" models  facilitates this analysis.
External loan disbursements,  repayments,  and interest payments are considered from the
point of view of donors as well as receivers.  The donors are classified according to
multilateral,  bilateral, private-guaranteed,  and private non-guaranteed while the
borrowers are categorized  by central government,  monetary sector,  or private sector
(including public sector organizations).  This enables  a reasonably  accurate mapping of
resource  supply and identification  of specific resource needs within say a medium-term
adjustment framework under consideration.  As such, "financing"  gaps are not just a
matter of an estimate  based on investment demand determined  by an incremental-output
ratio.  Rather, they are the result of a common-sense  dialogue, which takes  into account
all possible  information available on expected  external and domestic developments,  the
emerging resource needs and available finance.
Given the pragmatic  way the World Bank/lMF models have been used in the
recent past as tools for a policy dialogue with member countries, it is somewhat
inappropriate  to state that these models  are used to "prescribe  policies" for developing
member  countries (see Hussain,  2001).  It is equally inaccurate to say that these models18
are used to "make growth projections..."  Rather,  the models are used essentially  to
explore resource  implications of different macroeconomic  scenarios.
These points have been brought into focus by Mussa  and Savastano (1999) when
they analyzed the IMF experience with stabilization programs.  They observe that:
...  the intellectual doctrine associated with IMF financial programming is primarily  a
recognition of basic accounting  identities supplemented  with a small number of
behavioral  relationships  and forecasts of key economic  variables, the latter two being
subject to revision as new evidence  becomes available.  This is topped with a reasonable
discretion in judging both the size of the required macroeconomic  adjustment and the
relative effectiveness  of the policy instruments available to the authorities to undertake
it."
Data and Estimation Issues
Comparing  the T-H and the Hairod-Domar models, Hussain refers to the
problems  of estimating the parameters  and the "inaccuracy  of the lCOR approach  in
measuring the financing  gap and in predicting growth perfonnances."  He claims that "in
contrast,  the basic parameters  of the T-H-l  approach  are the price and income elasticities of
demand  for exports  and  imports ......... these elasticities.....are,  therefore, fairly  constant
and largely exogenous,  and hence more reliable to use for predictive purposes."
Economists at the country level  and in international  organizations  are well aware of the
difficulties associated with economic data. There is no empirical evidence  to show that19
trade data in developing countries  are  in anyway "better"  or more "reliable" than
investment  or consumption data. Furthermore,  Bairam and Ng (2001 ) who investigated
the stability of export and income elasticities embodied in the T-H model found that the
export and import demand  functions for Canada and UK were unstable during the period
1973-95. The sample of countries studied by Bairam and Ng included Canada, New
Zealand,  and the UK,  where statistics  are better developed than in most developing
countries.  Thus, there seems to be no guarantee of the stability of the elasticities in
question for most of the developing  countries.  If these parameters are not stable the, T-H
model is bound  to yield biased results.
Concluding  remarks.
The brief examination of the World Bank and the T-H models  reveals that the
latter is a somewhat of a partial representation  of the former.  The T-H model lays
emphasis on the balance of payments constraint only and has not taken into explicit
consideration  the aggregative  saving-investment  behavior that is  implicit in the balance
of payments picture. Thus, the exposition  has missed the important point made by
Easterly regarding the theoretical  and empirical weaknesses of the investment/growth
relationship underlying the World Bank model.  Both Easterly and Hussain, however,  fail
to realize the practical ways in which these theoretical  and empirical weaknesses  are
overcome in practical applications of these models. The World Bank's model  is only a
starting point of a policy dialogue between donors and developing  countries that20
eventually converges  to agreements  on the magnitude and time path of resource flows.  In
this sense, both Easterly  and Hussain  seem to be chasing after non-existing  "ghosts".
It may be pertinent to quote what Paul Krugman said recently ( Krugman,  2000)
when he considered the question how complicated  a model has to be:
"...  what we know pretty well, from  decades of trying to give micro-foundations  to
macro,  is that logical completeness  and intellectual  satisfaction are not necessarily
indications  that a model will actually do a better job of tracking what really happens.  For
many purposes, the small, ad-hoc models are as good as or better than the carefully
specified,  maximizing intertemporal  model."
Considering Krugman's observation,  although made in another context, and what Mussa
and Savastano  have said about the pragmatic use of IMF'  financial programming model,
one might be tempted to conclude that the "ghost of the financing gap" after all may not
be a bad ghost to live with, until a credible alternative  is found.21
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Appendix  1.
Symbols  used.
Y  - Gross domestic product at market prices
C  - Total consumption
I  - Gross domestic fixed capital formation (investment)
X  - Export of goods and services
IM  - lmports of goods and services.
NFY  - Net factor income
NCT  - Net current transfers
KTfg  Capital transfers  to government from abroad
DFI  - Direct foreign  investment
POR  - Portfolio investment
NLT  - Net long-tern  borrowing
NST  - Net short-term  borTowing
dRES  - Change in external reserves
GAPF  - Financing requirements for closing the balance of payments gap.'l
Td  - Direct taxes
Ti  - Indirect taxes
Sub  - Subsidies
NCTfg - Net foreign current transfers to government
NTXpg  - Non-tax revenue  of government
NFfg  - Net foreign  factor payments by government
NCTgp  - Net current transfers  from government  to private sector
" For siilplicity, goveimiient  and  privatc  sectors flows  hiavC  bccn aggregated to show NFY,NCT,NLT,NST  on a net  basis.
Note also that the  flow-of-funds  matrix in table  2 contain  morc details  than shown  in the equations in the text.25
NFgp  - Net factor payments by govermnent  to private sector
NFgm  - Net factor payments by government  to monetary sector
Cg  - Govermnent consumption
Krev  - Capital revenue
Ig  - Govenmment  investment
NKTRgp-  Net private capital transfers  of government
Lmg  - Governiuent sector borrowing  from the monetary  sector
NLTfg - Net long-tern  borTowing from abroad
NSTfg - Net short-tern  borrowing from abroad
KTfg  - Net foreign capital transfers
Lpg  - Net govermnent  borrowing from the private sector.
Lmp  - Private sector borrowing from the monetary sector:  i.e. change  in the stock
of domestic  credit to the private sector (DCp)
Lmg  - Government sector borrowing from the monetary  sector:  i.e. change in the
stock of domestic credit to the govemnment sector (DCg)
dNOL  - Change in net other liabilities of the monetary  system
M  - Broad money  (M2)
dM  - Change in broad money  stock
P  - Price level
y  - Real GDP at market prices
v  - Velocity of circulation of broad money.
ICOR  - Incremental  capital-output ratio
c  - Propensity to consume26
NCTR  - Net current transfers in real terms  2 received by the rest of the
economy from the other sectors1 3
Imi  - Demand for ith import category;'4
RERi  - Real exchange  rate for the ith import category.'5
Ximn  - Exports of manufacturing  goods
Yf  - Trading partners  income level
RERrn  - Real exchange  rate for manufactures.
Gxi  - exogenously  given growth  rate of export category  i.
2 If a component  specific deflator of nct current transfers  is not available the deflator used to deflate the specific  itcm in net
current transfers  is the domestic  absorption deflator.
IS An exampie  of transfcrs that contribute  to a person's net disposable  income  is worker's  remittances from  abroad and
pension  payments  by the government.
" The import components identified  in the model  arc: food, consumer goods,  intermediate  raw materials, intermediate
manufactured,  capital goods  and  fueli and other petrolettm based products.
I5  In the lincar formii of the specific  ftinctions uscd,  thc user spccifies  the elasticitics of demand with respect to income (y)  and
the real  cxchange  rate (RER)27
Appendix  2: Illustrative Flow-of-Funds Matrix (World Bank  Model)
Current  Rest of  Rest of  National
Account  Government  Monetary  Economy  World  Accounts  Totals
Government  Td  CTfg  Ti
NTXpg  -Sub
Monetary  Ngm  Npm  Nfm
Rest of  Ngp  Nmp  Nfp  Yfc
Economy  CTgp  PROFfp
WRfp
CTfp
Rest of  CTgf  Nmf  Npf  IM
World  Ngf  PROFpf  -x
CTpf
National  Cg  Cp
Accounts  Sg  Sp  Sf
Totals
Capital  Rest of  Rest of  National
Account  Government  Monetary  Economy  World  Accounts  Totals











Rest of  NFAma  DFIA  Sf
World  NFAdmb  PORAeq
PORAde
Lpf
National  Ig  Ip
Accounts
Totals28
Equations of the Thirlwall-Hussain  Model (using T-H equation numbers)
m= E(p-  ep-)+p  y  (2)
x=/8(pd  +e-p,)+ow  (3)
0(pd +e+x)+rk  = pf +m  (4)
(1  + E1  + E)(pd + e-  pf )+  0OcW+T(k -pdf -e)  (5)
(i+e)(p, +e-pf  )+Ox+r(k-pP -e)  (6)
ow  x
y= -or-  (7)
k  (I10E)  -+(p,+e)  (8
;o*  - (I +  +E)(p,  + e - p  f)-  +(8
k  -+(p,,  +e)  (9)
(I-E)
m  = rate of growth of real imports
x  = rate of growth of real exports
y  = rate of growth of real income
w  = rate of growth of world  income
Pf  = rate of change in the foreign price of imports
Pd  = rate of change in domestic prices
k  = rate of change in nominal capital inflows
e  = rate of change in the exchange  rate measured as the foreign price of domestic
currency
E  = price elasticity of demand for imports  (E  < 0)
,B  = price elasticity of demand for exports  (,B < 0)
if  = income elasticity of demand for imports (7f>0)
U  = income elasticity of demand for exports (oa >O)29
E)  = proportion of the total import bill "financed" by export earnings
= proportion of the total import bill "financed" by capital flows
y  = target growth rate
k'  = rate of growth of nominal capital inflows  (measured in foreign currency)
required to achieve the target growth rate  y